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Introduction and summary
In the United States, commercial banks can select among
three primary federal regulators. A bank chooses a
chartering agency and decides whether it will be a
Federal Reserve System (Fed) member, thereby select-
ing its regulatory authority. A nationally chartered bank
is regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). If it is a Fed member, a state-chartered
bank has the Fed as its primary federal regulator; other-
wise, it is overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (FDIC).1 By choosing its charter and deciding
whether to be a Fed member, a bank effectively selects
its regulator.
This article explores how banks use their option
to select a regulator. Specifically, I examine banks that
switch from one regulator to another. Is the ability to
switch regulators a positive aspect of our current sys-
tem? I offer some insight into this issue by examining
whether banks benefit from switching and how switch-
ing affects social welfare. This study helps shed light
on the behavior of regulators and the efficacy of the
current system of multiple regulators. There has been
debate about whether regulators, when setting policies,
act in the public interest or not. This article builds on
Rosen (2003), where I focused on whether the regula-
tory competition was beneficial or destructive. Com-
petition could spur useful innovation or regulatory
flexibility, thereby allowing banks to benefit without
reducing social welfare. It could also be a “race for
the bottom”—or a “competition for laxity,” to use
former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns’s
term—if regulators try to attract banks by easing re-
strictions on unsafe or unsound practices. The evidence
presented here is not consistent with a race for the
bottom, while there is some evidence of beneficial
competition. In general, a bank’s return either stays
the same or increases after it switches regulators, while
its risk of failure does not rise.
While most banks never switch regulators, the ag-
gregate number of switchers is not small. Over 10 per-
cent of banks switched regulators at least once during
the period 1977–2003. I compare banks that switch
with others that do not in an attempt to learn why banks
switch. I find that, prior to changing regulators, switchers
have approximately the same return on assets as oth-
er banks, and switchers are somewhat riskier. Small
banks are less likely than large banks to switch regu-
lators, but this is largely due to the fact that small banks
are less likely to be in a bank holding company. Non-
lead banks that are in a holding company are more
likely to switch than either lead (largest) banks in a
holding company or banks not in a holding company.
The effect of a switch on return and risk can in-
dicate whether switches are beneficial. I find that banks
generally increase their return when they switch reg-
ulators. There is little significant impact of a switch
on risk. Banks tend to reduce their equity-to-asset ra-
tio following a switch, but more inclusive measures
of risk, such as the bank failure rate, point toward no
increase in risk. An increase in return with no signifi-
cant increase in risk is evidence consistent with bene-
ficial competition. However, the aggregate results hide
differences over the sample period in the performance
of banks that switch.
The percentage of banks switching varies through-
out my sample period—rising in the late 1970s, then
falling to a lower rate in the 1980s, before rising again
in the 1990s (see figure 1). There are many reasons
why banks switch regulators, some of which may ex-
plain part of the pattern of switching over time. A switch17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
may be prompted by changes in the structure of a
banking organization, issues relating to the interaction
between a banking organization and its regulators, or
a shift in strategy sought by a banking organization.
The sample period I explore—1977–2003—was one
of major changes in banking, both in the structure of
the industry and in the regulatory framework under
which it operated. I explore whether the characteris-
tics of banks that switch regulators vary over time,
perhaps indicating changing motivations for switch-
ing. I find that prior to 1992, switching regulators
has little impact on overall risk and return. However,
switches in the latter part of the sample, specifically
1992–2003, have a significant impact on performance.
Banks that switch in this period show an increase in
return without a commensurate increase in risk, as
would be expected if there is beneficial competition.
Note that the post-1991 period is also when the rate
of switching is at its highest.
The plan of the article is as follows. First, I pro-
vide an overview of when banks switch primary reg-
ulators. Next, I review the arguments for and against
a system in which banks can choose among multiple
regulators. Then, I examine the characteristics of banks
that switch primary regulators and present an analysis
of how switches affect performance, including failure
probabilities.
The pattern of banks switching primary
regulators
Banks have been switching primary regulatory
agencies for many years (Scott, 1977, documents
switches from 1950 to 1974). I examine switches that
occurred from 1977 to 2003, a period that covers ma-
jor changes in banking and bank regulation. I identi-
fy the year a bank changes primary regulators from
the Reports of Income and Condition (call reports).
Table 1 gives an overview of the banks that switched
primary regulators. As table 1 shows, there were 2,298
switches during the sample period, an average of 85 per
year. Over the sample period, 10.8 percent of banks
left their respective regulators at least once (0.7 percent
of banks switched more than once). Table 1 also pro-
vides a breakdown of switches based on the size of the
bank. The smallest banks were the least likely to switch.
The pattern of banks switching regulators can be
partially explained by regulatory changes. In 1980,
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) was passed. Prior to DIDMCA,
there were important differences among regulators.
For example, reserve requirements (the funds a bank
must hold against specified deposit liabilities) depended
on whether a bank was a member of the Federal Re-
serve System. DIDMCA leveled the playing field for all
banks, regardless of membership in the Federal Reserve
System. It is possible that many of the regulatory
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Banks that switch primary federal regulators, 1977–2003























Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.18 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
switches that occurred prior to and immediately after
passage of DIDMCA were related to the changes insti-
tuted by the act rather than any actions of the regulators.
During the 1980s, states gradually reduced their
restrictions on interstate and intrastate expansion (Amel,
1991; Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002). This may have
prompted the merger wave in the 1980s and could
have led to some of the switches of primary regulators
during that decade. In addition, the Riegle–Neal Act
of 1994 removed the restrictions on interstate branching.
This act was phased in over the next few years as states
gradually adopted its provisions (Dick, 2006).
Merger activity, and switches associated with
mergers, varied significantly over the sample period.
Figure 2 gives the number of merger-related and other
switches by year. I define a bank as having switched
because of a merger if it switches its primary regula-
tor in the year of its merger or the following year. If
banks with different primary regulators merge, the
newly formed bank will have to choose one of the two
regulators. Following a merger, if the acquiring bank
changes from its pre-merger regulator to the target
bank’s regulator, then I record this as a switch of pri-
mary regulators for the newly formed bank. A total of
779 banks switched regulators following a merger,
one-third of all switches.
In the main analysis of the article that follows, I do
not include banks that have recently merged. An ob-
jective of this article is to examine whether the abili-
ty of banks to switch regulators is a valuable option.
This is difficult to do with switches following mergers
for at least two reasons. The first is that, as noted above,
banks with different primary regulators are forced to
choose one. This leads to a different—and likely, low-
er—threshold for switching regulators than for non-
merging banks. It is possible that the inclusion of
TABLE 1
Banks that switch primary federal regulators, 1977–2003
Total assets
All switching Total assets less between $1 billion Total assets greater
banks than $1 billion and $10 billion than $10 billion
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Year of banks of banks of banks of banks of banks of banks of banks of banks
1977 79 0.55 79 0.55 0 0.00 0 0.00
1978 118 0.82 118 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00
1979 89 0.62 89 0.63 0 0.00 0 0.00
1980 78 0.54 75 0.53 2 1.15 1 5.56
1981 56 0.39 55 0.39 1 0.54 0 0.00
1982 62 0.43 57 0.40 5 2.38 0 0.00
1983 61 0.42 58 0.41 3 1.29 0 0.00
1984 73 0.51 70 0.50 3 1.18 0 0.00
1985 78 0.55 77 0.55 1 0.35 0 0.00
1986 78 0.55 72 0.52 6 1.97 0 0.00
1987 78 0.58 76 0.58 2 0.63 0 0.00
1988 78 0.60 77 0.61 1 0.31 0 0.00
1989 64 0.51 61 0.50 3 0.97 0 0.00
1990 64 0.53 61 0.52 2 0.66 1 2.22
1991 72 0.62 68 0.60 4 1.37 0 0.00
1992 105 0.93 90 0.82 14 4.33 1 1.96
1993 124 1.14 111 1.06 12 3.74 1 1.82
1994 101 0.99 96 0.97 4 1.35 1 1.75
1995 154 1.58 140 1.50 12 3.88 2 2.90
1996 83 0.89 78 0.87 3 1.03 2 2.99
1997 111 1.25 101 1.18 10 3.79 0 0.00
1998 119 1.39 115 1.40 4 1.42 0 0.00
1999 80 0.96 76 0.95 4 1.46 0 0.00
2000 80 0.99 70 0.90 9 3.32 1 1.43
2001 71 0.90 62 0.82 7 2.50 2 3.03
2002 69 0.90 63 0.86 6 2.11 0 0.00
2003 73 0.95 63 0.87 8 2.46 2 2.63
Total 2,298 0.73 2,158 0.70 126 1.76 14 1.18
Note: Size classes are based on total assets in 2003 dollars.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
banks that switch regulators concurrent with a merg-
er will bias the results toward finding no impact from
switching. The second reason for dropping merger-
related switches is perhaps more important. A merger
can significantly affect the reported return and risk
for a bank. Costs related to the integration of the merg-
ing banks can depress the return for several years.
Also, the decision to participate in a merger may be
related to return and risk. Banks may be more likely
to be merger targets when their return has been de-
clining or when their risk has been increasing. This
may bias the before-and-after comparison of return
and risk for banks that merge.
Bank mergers affect not just the merging banks,
but also other banks. The bank merger waves in the
1980s and the 1990s increased the average size of a bank
dramatically. However, these waves had a much smaller
effect on local market competition, with the average
market concentration index essentially unchanged. These
changes affected competition in local markets (see, for
example, Berger, Udell, and Rosen, 2005). Some switch-
es of regulators may have been partially in response to
these repercussions of bank consolidation. These switch-
es are included in the sample, since they do not suffer
from the drawbacks noted in the previous paragraph.
DIDMCA and the merger waves may have induced
some of the changes in my sample period. However,
there are many switches that cannot be explained
purely by regulatory changes or industry consolida-
tion. In the next section, I examine additional possible
explanations for switches of primary regulators.
Are multiple regulators
beneficial?
There has been a debate over the best
regulatory structure for a long time (see
Rosen, 2003, for some examples). This
section briefly explores why banks switch
regulators and discusses some concerns
about the current regulatory system, as
well as some of its benefits.
When bank managers are asked why
they change primary regulators, they gen-
erally respond in one of three ways. These
managers claim that a bank switches be-
cause it can gain additional powers (as
Chase Manhattan Bank did when it changed
the primary regulator of its Delaware bank
in 1990); save on regulatory compliance
costs (as Chase Manhattan Bank did after
its merger with Chemical Bank in 1995);
or expand more easily nationwide (as HSBC
USA did when it changed its charter in
2004). Broadly speaking, regulation at the three agen-
cies—the OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC—and among
the states (for state-chartered banks) is similar.2 But
for some banks, the differences among regulators
might be important enough to induce a switch. Dur-
ing part of the sample period, for example, the insur-
ance powers granted to banks varied among regulators.
To conduct certain insurance activities, a bank might
have needed to switch regulators. Thus, Chase Man-
hattan switched the regulator of its Delaware bank to
allow it to sell insurance.
Some switches might be prompted because of
the costs of regulation, which are both indirect and
direct. The indirect costs include managerial and le-
gal costs involved in meeting with bank examiners
and making required reports. Indirect costs also in-
volve the opportunity costs of restrictions on portfo-
lio choices imposed on banks by regulators, such as
reserve requirements and expedited funds availability.3
There is no reason to believe that there are systemat-
ic differences in the indirect costs that banks would
face at the different agencies. However, there are dif-
ferences in direct costs. Both the OCC and the FDIC
charge for bank exams, but the Fed does not. This may
seem to give the Fed a cost advantage, but examina-
tion of state-chartered banks is shared with state reg-
ulators, who charge for their exams. Still, there can
be cost differences among regulators. This may induce
some switches if the OCC, the FDIC, or some states
change the cost of exams (or if, because of competition
in banking, a bank feels it has to squeeze out additional
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cost savings). Cost considerations may have also
prompted some holding companies to simplify their
regulatory structures.
From a social perspective, some question whether
having multiple regulators is a good idea. There are
several potential drawbacks to the current regulatory
system. At minimum, having multiple regulators in-
troduces complications. For instance, when J. P.
Morgan Chase merged with Bank One in 2004, J. P.
Morgan Chase Bank had a state charter and Bank One
had a national charter. As part of the merger process,
J. P. Morgan Chase had to decide which charter to
adopt (and if it chose a state charter, whether to become
a Fed member). This took time and resources that
would not have been necessary if there were only a
single bank regulator. Moreover, when it selected a
national charter, the bank’s former state regulator had
to shift its personnel and pricing to account for the
loss of a major bank. These costs may not be large,
but they are certainly present.4
A potentially more serious issue is that regula-
tors might not always act in the social interest. Stigler
(1971) points out that regulators can be captured by
the firms they cover because those inside a particular
industry care a lot more about the regulators’ decisions
than outsiders do. As a result, they may choose poli-
cies that benefit banks rather than the public.
Related to this concern, the literature on regula-
tory structure explores a “race for the bottom” among
regulatory agencies. In the 1970s, then-Fed Chairman
Arthur Burns commented that he feared destructive
competition among regulators for banks (their custom-
ers, in a sense). He brought up the possibility of what
he called a “competition for laxity,” a scenario in which
banks would relax regulation to capture market share
(see Scott, 1977). Since the budget of an agency de-
pends in part on the number and size of the firms it
regulates, regulators might compete against each other
by offering lenient treatment in order to attract firms.
When Chase Manhattan Bank elected to have a state
rather than a national charter, subsequent to its merger
with Chemical Bank in 1995, the OCC lost fees amount-
ing to 2 percent of its budget. Similarly, when its suc-
cessor, J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, returned to a national
charter after its merger with Bank One in 2004, the
New York Banking Department (the state regulatory
agency) lost 27 percent of its revenues. If either agency
was concerned with maximizing its budget, it would
have an incentive to remove burdens on banks to keep
them from switching.5
A race for the bottom could allow banks to manip-
ulate the system. That is, banks might choose their
primary federal regulator (and potentially, their state
of incorporation, and thereby, their state regulator) to
take actions that benefit the bank but are not in the public
interest. An example of this would be a bank that
switched regulators in order to adopt a new, risky strate-
gy (or to hide risks it was already taking). The risk
could increase the exposure of the deposit insurance
fund. It is important to note that a bank can only switch
to a new regulator if that regulator approves. Thus, reg-
ulators have the ability to block switches of this kind.
On the other hand, having multiple regulators of-
fers potential benefits. A single regulator might have
less incentive to allow banks to undertake new powers
or to use new products. There is a natural tendency
for regulators to be risk averse, since they are assigned
blame for anything that goes wrong, but may not be
recognized for permitting beneficial changes. Poten-
tially beneficial changes that one regulator views as
too risky might be adopted by another regulator. In
addition, having multiple regulators allows for some
specialization. Tiebout (1956) presents a model of
public goods provision by local communities that has
often been modified to examine other regulatory is-
sues. The Tiebout framework can be used to show
that under certain conditions (including when there
are no externalities and there is costless mobility),
regulatory competition leads to optimal standards
setting. Different localities can offer distinct menus
of public goods, with each individual choosing the
menu best suited for that individual (referred to as
Tiebout sorting). This model underlies the arguments
for local control of securities regulation (Romano,
1998), antitrust enforcement (Easterbrook and Fischel,
1991), and environmental policy (Revesz, 2000). These
papers also claim that the benefits of competition among
local agencies eliminate (or should eliminate) a race
for the bottom.
Connected to Tiebout sorting, another reason
that banks might switch is that regulatory enforcement
may differ among agencies. There may be an explicit
policy shift at a particular agency. For example, in 1991,
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was worried
that examiners were contributing to a “credit crunch”
by requiring banks to hold too much capital against
loans. This was interpreted by some as a signal for ex-
aminers to relax enforcement. This could have encour-
aged banks to switch to the Fed from the other agencies.6
An additional complication to this analysis is that
a bank regulatory agency is essentially a collection of
examiners. Unlike regulators in many other areas, ex-
aminers in banking frequently make subjective deci-
sions about the banks they visit.7 Berger, Kyle, and
Scalise (2000) review examiner and regulatory agen-
cy discretion when monitoring banks. Examiners go21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
into a bank to evaluate its risk. Based on this assessment,
the examiners decide whether the bank’s reserve for
loan losses is sufficient, and then they assign a strength
rating—the CAMELS (capital, asset quality, manage-
ment, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity) rating—to
the bank. If a bank wants to change its portfolio, its
examiners must decide how to react. The examiners
can either accede to the change or make it costly for
the bank by requesting a higher loan loss reserve
(resulting in a charge against income) or by giving
the bank a lower CAMELS rating (resulting in greater
regulatory costs for the bank). Thus, to an extent, ex-
aminers can decide how costly it is for a bank to add
risk. Having multiple regulators and the ability to
switch among them allows the bank to escape exam-
iners that the bank feels are out of line.
One potential problem that a bank might have is
that its examiners can exploit the discretion they have
when assessing the bank to serve their own ends. Some
examiners may be interested in leading a “quiet life”
(Rosen, 2003).8 That is, they may want to get by with
as little work and as little career risk as possible. To
get a quiet life, some examiners might prefer to regu-
late banks with portfolios that are as simple as possi-
ble to evaluate.
There is another reason why examiners may put
up roadblocks to change by banks. Regulatory be-
havior may be influenced by a desire to avoid criti-
cism from groups other than the firms that examiners
assess. Importantly, Congress and public interest
groups may criticize ex post actions that were proper
ex ante (as Kane, 1989, argues they did early in the
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s). This gives reg-
ulatory agencies and, by extension, examiners an in-
centive to avoid actions that could increase the risk
of bank failure. Fear of criticism may induce risk aver-
sion on the part of examiners who want a quiet life.
Whether having the ability to switch regulators
leads to beneficial competition or a race for the bot-
tom can be tested by examining which banks switch
and how switching affects the performance of these
banks. The key here is to decide which switches are
“beneficial” and which are not. A beneficial switch
allows a bank to move to a better risk–return trade-
off without increasing societal risk. I used the risk of
bank failure as a proxy for societal risk. Banks are
overseen by government agencies for many reasons.
For instance, banks are regulated in order to maintain
a smoothly operating payments system and to con-
firm that their deposits are insured. Both of these ob-
jectives imply that regulators want to limit excessive
risk-taking by banks, which should limit bank fail-
ures. A race for the bottom might work this way:
Regulators could allow banks that switch to increase
societal risk without a compensatory increase in re-
turn. Bank managers or shareholders could profit from
this, but only by taking advantage of the deposit in-
surance system. Beneficial competition among regu-
lators, on the other hand, would allow banks to move
to a better risk–return trade-off without increasing
failure probabilities.9 Note that these tests are sufficient
to indicate beneficial competition or a race for the
bottom, but there are other factors that may not be
figured in. Beneficial competition can help all banks,
not just those that switch. I cannot directly test for
this, but the increase in bank profits and decrease in
bank failures over the past 15 years are consistent with
beneficial competition—and not a race for the bot-
tom. Still, since these trends are also a function of
macroeconomic factors, this is at best weak evidence.
Characteristics of banks that switch
regulators
To evaluate banks that switch regulators, I need
measures of return and risk. Return is easy to mea-
sure. I use the return on assets (ROA), but its results
are similar to other measures, such as the return on
equity. Unfortunately, there is no simple inclusive
measure of risk. I use direct and indirect risk evalua-
tions. The direct measure of risk I use is a failure pre-
diction model. As noted above, bank failures can
reduce the smooth operating of the payments system
and increase losses to the deposit insurance fund.
Thus, if a regulator allows banks that switch to take
actions that increase their failure probabilities, this
suggests a race for the bottom. To attain a second es-
timate of failure probability and to determine how
risk changes relative to return, I use four accounting
ratios that capture different aspects of risk. The most
direct is the Sharpe ratio, which is the ratio of ROA
to the standard deviation of the ROA (again, the re-
sults are similar to the return on equity). To construct
this measure for year t, I use the ROA for year t as
the numerator. The denominator is the standard devi-
ation of the semiannual ROA (expressed as an annual
return) for all the periods from year t – 4 to year t for
which return data exists. I keep all observations with
at least two years of return data as of year t. Even
with ten semiannual periods, I do not have a very
precise measure of risk. Still, while noisy, the ratio
of ROA to its standard deviation does give a picture
of the risk–return trade-off.
I also use other accounting measures of risk tra-
ditionally used to evaluate banks. The equity-to-asset
ratio (EQUITY/ASSET) is a measure of leverage,
with higher values indicating lower risk, since equity22 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
offers a cushion against failure. The loan-to-asset
ratio (LOAN/ASSET) is likely to be correlated with
risk as well. Loans are among the riskiest assets on
bank balance sheets. A bank with more loans, all else
being equal, is more likely to fail. However, loans
can vary significantly in risk. To measure the riskiness
of a loan portfolio, I use the charge-off-to-loan ratio
(CHRG/LOAN).10 This ratio reflects expected losses
on loans made in the past. A riskier loan portfolio, all
else being equal, has higher charge-offs. Charge-offs
can also reflect bad luck, poor management, or invest-
ments in risky but predictable loans (for example, some
credit card loans). To capture risk differences on the
liability side, I use the ratio of deposits to liabilities
(DEP/LIAB). Deposits are a more stable source of
funding than other liabilities, such as loans from other
banks. Results based on these ratios should be viewed
with caution, since they may be associated with changes
in productivity as well as risk.
The loan-to-asset ratio and the charge-off-to-loan
ratio can also be viewed as proxies for the workloads
of bank examiners. Examiners have to spend more
effort when reviewing loans than other assets, and
they have to spend even more effort when reviewing
nonperforming loans than other loans. If examiners
desire a quiet life, they prefer banks to have nonloan
assets, such as cash and government securities, and
they are inclined toward banks that do not issue loans
with a high probability of becoming nonperforming.
To assess whether a switch of primary federal
regulators is beneficial, it is useful to know what leads
a bank to switch regulators. To do this, I use a simple
model to predict which banks will switch regulators
as a function of the return and risk characteristics of
the banks. The dependent variable, SWITCH, is a dum-
my that takes the value 1 in year t if a bank switches
regulators in the year t + 1. The model is:




When analyzing the data, I drop banks in any year
that they are in the top or bottom 1 percent of ROA,
EQUITY/ASSET, LOAN/ASSET, or DEP/LIAB.
To examine whether banks that switch regulators
are different from other banks, it is important to con-
trol for reasons unrelated to return and risk that might
lead a bank to shift its primary regulator. Table 1
TABLE 2
Performance of banks prior to switching regulators
Banks that switch Banks that never switch
Standard Standard Test of difference
Mean Median deviation Mean Median deviation of means (p value)
ROA 0.93 1.00 0.65 0.93 1.03 0.78 0.842
SHARPE RATIOa 0.84 0.89 0.61 0.87 0.93 0.59 0.151
EQUITY/ASSET 8.69 8.11 2.54 9.18 8.59 2.80 0.000***
LOAN/ASSET 55.93 57.02 13.79 53.92 55.08 13.99 0.000***
CHRG/LOAN 0.43 0.19 0.87 0.56 0.22 1.70 0.000***
DEP/LIAB 95.50 98.13 7.98 96.58 98.42 6.14 0.000***
LOG ASSETS 7.88 7.85 0.51 7.77 7.73 0.48 0.000***
NONHC BANK 0.34 0 0.47 0.44 0 0.50 0.000***
LEADBANK HC 0.41 0 0.49 0.44 0 0.50 0.024**
NONLEAD SREG 0.10 0 0.30 0.07 0 0.26 0.003***
NONLEAD DREG 0.16 0 0.36 0.05 0 0.21 0.000***
OCC 0.43 0 0.49 0.30 0 0.46 0.000***
FED 0.16 0 0.36 0.07 0 0.26 0.000***
FDIC 0.42 0 0.49 0.63 1 0.48 0.000***
Observations 1,246 231,948
aThe Sharpe ratio only includes banks with at least two years of data.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: Banks that switch regulators include all banks that switch regulators, except those that switch in the year of or year following a merger.
Variable definitions are given in the text. The data are year-end (except for ROA, which is for the full year) for the period 1977–2003.  Data for
switchers are from the year prior to a switch. The variables ROA, EQUITY/ASSET, LOAN/ASSET, CHRG/LOAN, and DEP/LIAB are expressed as
percentages. All other variables, except LOG ASSETS, are expressed as ratios.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of mergers in the 1980s.12 The late period includes all
switches from 1992 to 2003. This includes the peak
of bank consolidation. This is also the time when the
proportion of banks that switch regulators is largest.
The second and third columns of table 3 present
regression results for the two smaller periods. There
are differences across the two periods in the magni-
tude and statistical significance of the return and risk
variables. For example, the coefficients on the Sharpe
ratio and the charge-off-to-loan ratio are larger and
statistically significant only in the late period. Still,
the overall pattern is similar. Return is not a predictor
of switching in either period, and banks that switch
look somewhat riskier in every dimension except
their level of charge-offs.
The control variables differ in important ways
across the two periods. In the early period, 1977–91,
small banks, all else being equal, are more likely to
switch regulators. This is reversed in the late period,
1992–2003, when large banks are more likely to switch.
Overall, banks that are not the lead bank in a holding
company are more likely to switch than either lead
banks or banks not in a holding company. Consistent
with a desire to simplify the regulatory structure of
their respective holding companies, non-lead banks
that have different charters than their lead banks switch
more often in both periods. Non-lead banks with the
same regulator as their lead banks are only more likely
to switch in the early period. This may reflect banks
switching to exploit differences among regulators in
the types of investments allowed, such as insurance
activities. These differences tended to be larger in the
early period than in the late period, especially once
the Financial Modernization Act (also known as the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act) was passed in 1999. The
regulatory dummies also provide some interesting in-
sights. Banks are more likely to switch from the Fed
than either the OCC (the omitted regulator) or the FDIC
in the early period. In the late period, however, banks
under the Fed are less likely to switch than those un-
der the OCC—and as likely as those under the FDIC.
Over the entire period, banks under the FDIC are the
least likely to switch.
The results suggest that banks that switch are
different from those banks that do not. They also
suggest that these differences depend on when the
banks switch. These findings do not help determine
whether there is a race for the bottom or beneficial
competition, but they point out the importance of
controlling for why and when banks switch, as well
as other bank characteristics.
shows that small banks are disproportionately less
likely than larger banks to switch regulators. For this
reason, I control for bank size using the log of total
assets (LOG ASSETS). Structural considerations may
play a role in the decision to switch. I control for holding
company status, using dummies for whether the bank is
the lead bank in a holding company (LEADBANK HC),
or whether it is a non-lead bank within a holding com-
pany that has the same (NONLEAD SREG) or differ-
ent (NONLEAD DREG) charter than the lead bank.
Banks not in a holding company (NONHC BANK)
compose the excluded category. This allows us to test
for switches that reduce the number of regulators to
which a holding company reports. There may also be
other differences across primary regulators. To con-
trol for this, I include dummies for whether a bank is
regulated by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC at the
end of year t – 1 (the OCC is the excluded category).
Finally, I include year dummies to control for systemic
changes, such as changes in overall levels of return
and risk in the industry as a whole.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the return,
risk, and control variables. Banks that switch regula-
tors have a similar return and Sharpe ratio to other banks.
There are differences between the two groups in the
other risk measures. The equity-to-asset, loan-to-asset,
and deposit-to-liability ratios all indicate higher risk
for switchers than for other banks that have not switched,
but switchers have a lower charge-off-to-loan ratio. How-
ever, I need to account for correlations among these vari-
ables and patterns in the proportion and type of banks
that switch. I do this using a regression framework.
Equation 1 is estimated using a logistic regres-
sion. The results of the regression are reported in the
first column of table 3. Consistent with the univariate
statistics, the coefficient on ROA is not statistically
significantly different from zero. So, I cannot use a
bank’s return to predict whether it will switch regula-
tors. Most of the risk variables, on the other hand, are
significant and can help predict which banks will switch.
Banks with a lower Sharpe ratio, more leverage, and
a lower deposit-to-liability ratio—all indicators of
higher risk—are more likely to switch. Pointing to a
trend in the other direction, banks with fewer charge-
offs, signaling less risk, are also more likely to switch.11
As figure 1 and table 1 show, the proportion of
banks that switch regulators varies over time. It is
possible that the strength of banks varies along with
switching intensity. To test this, I divide my sample
period into two smaller periods. The early period in-
cludes all switches from 1977 to 1991. This covers
the implementation of DIDMCA and the lesser wave24 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
Performance of banks that switch
regulators
In this section, I examine the change in performance
at banks that switch regulators, comparing return and
risk before and after a switch. This allows us to address
two issues. The first is whether switching is good for
banks and the second is whether it is good for society.
Beneficial competition implies that banks can benefit
from switching while the probability of bank failure
(our proxy for social welfare) does not increase. If
switching allows banks to take actions that increase
the risk of bank failure, then that is evi-
dence consistent with a race for the bottom.
The section is divided into two parts. I
examine the accounting measures of perfor-
mance in the first part and then a failure
prediction model in the second part.
 Accounting measures of performance
To examine how performance changes
preceding and following a switch of reg-
ulators, I use the following model:
2) Performance = f(Pre-change
indicators, Post-change indicators,
Control variables),
where performance is measured using
our return and risk variables. The model
is estimated for the entire sample of banks,
not just banks that switched. This allows
us to compare changes in performance at
banks that switch with otherwise similar
banks that have not.
A priori, there is no reason to believe
that the changes induced by a switch of
regulators should be immediately reflected
in the performance. For this reason, I look
over five-year periods before and after a
switch. This allows a long enough time
before a switch to see whether there was
some change in a bank’s performance that
might prompt a switch. It also allows a
long enough time after a switch to ensure
that all the changes that result from it are
reflected in the accounting data I examine.
For banks that switch regulators, I use
dummy variables for pre- and post-switch
periods as well as a trend variable. Let
DUMMY PRE, the pre-switch dummy,
equal 1 for each of the five years prior to
a switch (year t – 5 to t – 1 for a switch
in year t) and equal 0 otherwise. Similarly,
let DUMMY POST, the post-switch dummy, equal 1
for each of the five years following a switch (year t + 1
to t + 5 for a switch in year t) and equal 0 otherwise.
For banks that never switch, both DUMMY PRE and
DUMMY POST equal 0. I set the trend variables so
that they are increasing in time. For banks that switch
in year t, let TREND PRE take the value 1 in year t – 5,
2 in year t – 4, and so on until it has the value 5 in
year t – 1. For other years and other banks, it equals 0.
Similarly, define TREND POST as taking the value 1
in year t + 1, 2 in year t + 2, and so on until it has the
TABLE 3
Probability that bank will switch regulators
in the next year
Early period Late period
Full sample (1977–91) (1992–2003)
ROA 0.020 0.031 –0.007
(0.451) (0.369) (0.872)
SHARPE RATIO –0.079 –0.056 –0.126
(0.035)** (0.233) (0.018)**
EQUITY/ASSET –0.023 –0.016 –0.032
(0.000)*** (0.033)** (0.000)***
LOAN/ASSET 0.0005 –0.001 0.002
(0.564) (0.380) (0.048)**
CHRG/LOAN –0.036 –0.024 –0.059
(0.011)** (0.121) (0.038)**
DEP/LIAB –0.003 –0.005 –0.001
(0.081)* (0.039)** (0.619)
LOG ASSETS 0.005 –0.067 0.102
(0.864) (0.068)* (0.008)***
LEADBANK HC 0.019 0.050 –0.036
(0.483) (0.159) (0.369)
NONLEAD SREG 0.121 0.190 –0.005
(0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.933)
NONLEAD DREG 0.489 0.577 0.347
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
FED 0.079 0.215 –0.160
(0.017)** (0.000)*** (0.004)***
FDIC –0.274 –0.356 –0.184
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Pseudo-R2 0.044 0.060 0.027
Observations 243,714 165,268 78,446
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: The data are from 1977 to 2003, with year dummies not shown.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a bank switches regulators
in the next calendar year. Other variable definitions are given in the text.
Robust p values adjusted for cluster effects are in parentheses.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003,
Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
value 5 in year t + 5 for switchers, and the value 0
otherwise.
The control variables are similar to those in the
prediction model in the previous section. The risk
choices a bank makes affect its return and vice versa.
Thus, I include risk and return variables as controls
(excluding the performance measure being estimated).
Results are qualitatively similar without these con-
trols. I also include the structural controls from the
prediction model. These cover the holding company
status and regulator of a bank. Finally, I use the log
of total assets as a control, since larger banks are more
diversified, all else being equal, and year dummies to
control for systemic changes.
Table 4 presents the results of regressions using
equation 2 for the risk and return measures. Panel A
gives the regression coefficients. Some but not all of
the trend and dummy variables are significant. What
I am most concerned with is the net change following
a switch. For example, the post-switch trend is signifi-
cant for the ROA, but the post-switch is not. What does
this say about the net change in ROA? To get an idea
of how important these changes are, it is necessary to
combine the trend and dummy variables. For example,
five years prior to a switch, the average bank has an
ROA that is 0.016 percentage points below that of an
otherwise similar bank that never switches (0.016 =
–0.018 + 0.002 ×  1). By the year before the switch, ROA
is 0.008 percentage points below that of an otherwise
similar bank that never switches (0.008 = –0.018 +
0.002 ×  5 with rounding), indicating an increase of
0.008 percentage points in ROA in the four years be-
fore a bank switches. The increasing return after a switch
is such that five years after a switch, the average bank
has an ROA that is 0.083 percentage points above
that of an otherwise similar bank that never switches
(0.083 = 0.008 + 0.015 ×  5 with rounding). Panel B
of table 4 presents the estimated changes for the years
before and after a switch.
The results for the period prior to a switch indi-
cate that banks are changing their balance sheets sig-
nificantly prior to a switch. Leverage increases as the
equity-to-asset ratio falls. Banks are also shedding loans.
If examiners want a quiet life, then changes such as
these may make them unhappy. This may, in turn, make
it more probable that a bank will switch regulators.
The results in panel B of table 4 show that return
rises significantly in the five years after a switch. They
also provide evidence on the accounting risk measures.
Overall, the picture on risk changes before and after
a switch is mixed. The key factors are that the Sharpe
ratio is unchanged but the equity-to-asset ratio decreases
heading into and following a switch.
To get an idea of how the risk and return chang-
es compare after a switch, I use the data in panel B of
table 4 to compare the percentage change in the equi-
ty-to-asset ratio (the risk measure that increases) to the
percentage change in ROA. The percentage change is
measured by dividing the change by the pre-switch
mean and is given in the final row of the table. From
the year prior to a switch to five years after the switch,
ROA is estimated to increase by 0.091 percentage
points, 9.8 percent of the average ROA prior to the
switch. Over a similar period, the equity-to-asset ra-
tio is estimated to decrease by 0.463 percentage points,
5.3 percent of the average ratio prior to a switch. Thus,
return increases by a larger fraction than the risk (as
measured by the accounting variables) increases. This,
in combination with no significant change in the Sharpe
ratio, suggests that banks do better following a switch
and provides no evidence that social risk increases.
Recall that the regression results in table 3 show
that the factors that lead banks to switch regulators have
changed over time. It makes sense, then, to see whether
the performance of banks before and after a switch
differs over time. To do this, let EARLY be a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a bank switches reg-
ulators between 1977 and 1991, and let LATE be a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a bank switches
regulators between 1992 and 2003. I create a series
of eight interaction variables using these dummies.
Each interaction variable is the product of one of the
period dummies and either TREND PRE, DUMMY
PRE, TREND POST, or DUMMY POST. Using these
variables, I estimate equation 2. Rather than present-
ing the entire regression results, table 5 gives the es-
timated changes relative to otherwise similar banks
that have not switched in the accounting return and
risk measures for the three periods, mirroring panel B
of table 4.13 It is clear from the table that the effect of
switching on return appears only in the late period.
Return increases significantly in the late period but
changes little in the early period. The effect of a switch
on risk is mixed in both periods but is driven by dif-
ferent factors in each. In the early period, the Sharpe
ratio is unchanged and charge-offs decrease, signaling
no change or a decrease in risk. But, the equity-to-
asset ratio increases, indicating higher risk. In the late
period, on the other hand, the Sharpe ratio increases
(in large part due to the increase in ROA), while
charge-offs also increase. The only constant is that
banks add leverage following a switch in both periods.
Also, while the coefficient on the change after a switch
in the late period is positive for the charge-off-to-loan
ratio regression, a deeper examination of the data (not




Return on Sharpe Equity-to- Loan-to-asset Charge-off-to- Deposit-to-
assets ratio asset ratio ratio loan ratio liability ratio
TREND PRE 0.002 –0.002 –0.079 –0.502 –0.004 –0.067
(0.724) (0.746) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.578) (0.254)
DUMMY PRE –0.018 –0.018 0.021 2.724 –0.008 –0.019
(0.533) (0.441) (0.832) (0.000)*** (0.805) (0.937)
TREND POST 0.015 0.002 –0.097 –0.222 0.005 0.102
(0.045)** (0.671) (0.000)*** (0.102) (0.690) (0.129)
DUMMY POST 0.008 –0.006 –0.353 0.938 –0.047 –0.349
(0.739) (0.779) (0.000)*** (0.044)** (0.145) (0.199)
ROA 1.467 –0.026 –0.672 0.415
(0.000)*** (0.855) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
SHARPE RATIO –0.617 –1.410 –0.234 –0.014
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.797)
EQUITY/ASSET 0.071 0.033 –1.310 0.027 0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.212)
LOAN/ASSET –0.003 –0.002 –0.041 –0.004 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.527)
CHRG/LOAN –0.138 –0.096 0.058 –0.279 0.007
(0.066)* (0.066)* (0.092)* (0.021)** (0.660)
DEP/LIAB 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.219) (0.524) (0.669)
LOG ASSETS 0.267 0.164 –1.159 2.348 0.077 –5.152
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
LEADBANK HC 0.163 0.068 –0.913 0.932 0.074 –0.453
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
NONLEAD SREG 0.059 0.013 –0.991 2.225 –0.001 –1.168
(0.000)*** (0.107) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.905) (0.000)***
NONLEAD DREG 0.065 –0.002 –0.926 1.611 0.031 –0.782
(0.000)*** (0.810) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.533) (0.000)***
FED 0.001 0.018 0.243 2.056 0.002 –0.790
(0.956) (0.036)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.962) (0.000)***
FDIC 0.103 0.063 0.056 1.698 0.062 –0.069
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.072)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.334)
Observations 253,291 249,988 249,988 249,988 249,988 249,988
R2 0.245 0.188 0.312 0.159 0.167 0.212
B. Estimated changes in accounting variables
Return on Sharpe Equity-to- Loan-to-asset Charge-off-to- Deposit-to-
assets ratio asset ratio ratio loan ratio liability ratio
Change from 5 years 0.008 –0.008 –0.315 –2.009 –0.017 –0.268
  prior to switch to (0.724) (0.746) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.578) (0.254)
  1 year prior to switch
Change from 1 year 0.029 0.025 –0.076 –0.503 –0.013 0.107
  prior to switch (0.195) (0.197) (0.000)*** (0.223) (0.629) (0.638)
  to 1 year after switch
Change from 1 year 0.091 0.034 –0.463 –0.396 0.006 0.517
  prior to 5 years (0.001)*** (0.139) (0.000)*** (0.500) (0.897) (0.072)*
  after switch
Change from 1 year 0.098 0.040 –0.053 –0.007 0.014 0.005
  prior to 5 years
  after switch divided
  by sample mean
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: The data are from 1977 to 2003, with year dummies not shown. Variable definitions are given in the text. For both panels A and B,
robust p values adjusted for cluster effects are in parentheses.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 5
Performance by periods, early (1977–91) and late (1992–2003)
Return on assets Sharpe ratio Equity-to-asset ratio
Early Late Early Late Early Late
Change from 5 years prior to switch 0.005 0.025 –0.033 0.046 –0.299 –0.235
to 1 year prior to switch (0.894) (0.553) (0.319) (0.161) (0.008)*** (0.132)
Change from 1 year prior to switch –0.046 0.115 –0.027 0.081 –0.038 –0.116
to 1 year after switch (0.177) (0.000)*** (0.363) (0.001)*** (0.673) (0.331)
Change from 1 year prior –0.012 0.211 –0.024 0.101 –0.324 –0.629
to 5 years after switch (0.774) (0.000)*** (0.490) (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)***
Change from 1 year prior to 5 years 0.014 0.205 0.029 0.117 0.039 0.068
after switch divided by sample mean
Loan-to-asset ratio Charge-off-to-loan ratio Deposit-to-liability ratio
Early Late Early Late Early Late
Change from 5 years prior to switch –2.811 –1.019 –0.017 –0.017 –0.439 0.057
  to 1 year prior to switch (0.000)*** (0.189) (0.690) (0.704) (0.137) (0.894)
Change from 1 year prior to switch 0.579 0.299 –0.417 0.053 –0.243 –0.211
  to 1 year after switch (0.324) (0.642) (0.066)* (0.085)* (0.885) (0.557)
Change from 1 year prior 0.623 –1.634 –0.147 0.186 0.578 0.419
  to 5 years after switch (0.403) (0.078)* (0.003)*** (0.013)** (0.094)* (0.401)
Change from 1 year prior to 5 years 0.012 0.027 0.258 0.736 0.006 0.004
  after switch divided by sample mean
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: The results are based on regressions of equation 1 with interaction terms between the period dummies and the pre- and post-switch
dummies and trend variables. Each regression has 249,988 observations. The change variables are calculated based on the coefficients on
the interaction involving the pre- and post-switch dummies and trend variables. Variable definitions are given in the text. Robust p values
adjusted for cluster effects are given in parentheses.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.
a large decline in charge-offs at banks that do not switch
rather than an increase at banks that switch.
The results in table 5 point out characteristics of
switchers and switching in the two periods, 1977–91
and 1992–2003. Prior to a switch, there is not much dif-
ference between the banks that switch in the early and
late periods. Return is flat, and the equity-to-asset and
loan-to-asset ratios are decreasing, although the change
in the two ratios is only significant in the early period.
The major differences between the two periods
are in the change in return and risk at banks that switch.
The most important is that return increases after a
switch only in the late period. In the early period, the
average change in return is statistically and economi-
cally insignificant. The findings for risk are mixed in
both periods. In the early period, there is no change in
the Sharpe ratio following a switch. This may reflect
the balancing of higher leverage and lower charge-offs.
In the late period, on the other hand, the Sharpe ratio
is increasing following a switch, indicating a reduction
in risk. However, leverage and charge-offs are increas-
ing, signifying higher risk.
The evidence using the accounting data is consis-
tent with beneficial competition, but only in the post-
1991 period. Return increases after a switch in the late
period, but not in the early period. The results for risk
are mixed, but there is no strong indication of higher
risk. In the late period, the best measure of risk—the
Sharpe ratio—signals a reduction in risk after a switch.
These findings are indicative of beneficial competi-
tion among regulatory agencies. However, before
drawing stronger conclusions, I need to examine the
direct measure of failure probabilities.28 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
Failure probability model
The accounting data present a mixed picture of
how switching primary federal regulators affects risk.
From a social perspective, the critical issue is whether
the changes in risk promote bank failure. To directly
examine this, I use a failure prediction model.
I use two approaches to determine whether switch-
ing regulators makes a bank more likely to fail than
if it had not switched. First, I estimate a failure pre-
diction model with a dummy for whether a bank has
recently switched regulators. Since so few banks fail
in any given year (approximately 0.5 percent per year),
I look at three- and five-year horizons to minimize
noise in the model. Let FAIL DUMMY X be a variable
that takes the value 1 in year t if a bank fails prior to
the end of year t + x, where x is either 3 years or 5 years.
In my sample, an average of 1.5 percent of banks fail
over a three-year horizon and 2.3 percent fail over a
five-year horizon. For banks that switch regulators,
I include just data for the years following the switch
because a bank’s decision to switch is only observed
if it survives long enough to complete the switch. To
include switches in the failure prediction model, let
SWITCH be a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if a bank has switched regulators within the past three
years, and the value 0 otherwise.14 I also interact
SWITCH with the period dummies.
For the prediction model, failure is assumed to
depend on the accounting return and risk measures used
earlier, as well as the log of total assets (since larger
banks are more diversified) and year dummies to
capture systemic movements in failure probabilities:
3) FAIL DUMMY X = f(SWITCH, LOG ASSETS,
ROA, SHARPE RATIO, EQUITY/ASSET,
LOAN/ASSET, CHRG/LOAN, DEP/LIAB,
year dummies).
I estimate the model two ways. First, to establish
a baseline, I only include observations for banks that
never switch. Then, I include all banks. The model is
estimated over the years 1977–2001 to allow at least
three years after a switch for banks to potentially fail
(since I have failure data through 2004).
In the analysis of the accounting data, I dropped
outliers because they often have a disproportionate ef-
fect on regression results. In this section, on the other
hand, all observations are included except banks with
negative equity (since these have effectively failed al-
ready). This is because it is precisely the outlier banks,
at least those in the lower tail, that are most likely to
fail in the near term. Excluding the outliers pushes the
results more toward switches reducing the probability
of failure, although, for the most part, the differences
are not statistically significant.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equa-
tion 3 using a logistic regression. The signs of the co-
efficients on the control variables are consistent with
expectations. Increasing either size or return decreases
failure probability, while increasing risk has the op-
posite effect. The coefficient on SWITCH is statistically
insignificant for both the three- and five-year failure
windows. This is not consistent with the hypothesis
that, all else being equal, a bank that has recently
switched regulators is more likely to fail than an other-
wise similar bank that has never switched.
The final column of table 6 includes the interac-
tion terms between SWITCH and the time dummies.
In this regression, the coefficient on SWITCH LATE
is positive and significant. The positive coefficient
on SWITCH LATE is consistent with the hypothesis
that, all else being equal, a bank that switched regula-
tors in the late period is more likely to fail than an
otherwise similar bank that has never switched.
The careful wording in the last sentences of the
previous two paragraphs reflects an assumption im-
plicit in the failure prediction model (equation 3). The
model assumes that a switching bank would have the
same risk–return profile whether or not it had switched.
In essence, it rules out the possibility that a bank is
able to, or chooses to, change its portfolio precisely
because it has switched regulators. For example, a
regulator involved in a race for the bottom might at-
tract new banks by allowing those banks to greatly
increase leverage (that is, decrease their equity-to-
asset ratio) after they switched to its oversight. If banks
that switched increased leverage, they would be more
likely to fail. However, if these banks failed at the
rate that otherwise similar banks with their new level
of leverage failed, then the coefficients on the switch
dummies in equation 3 would not be significantly
positive. Related to this proposition, if regulatory
specialization allows banks that switch regulators to
increase return and reduce their failure rate, but the
failure rate is still above that at otherwise similar banks
with their new ROA, then the coefficients on the switch
dummies in equation 3 would be significantly posi-
tive. Since ROA increases for banks that switch reg-
ulators in the late period, this means that the
significant positive coefficient on SWITCH LATE
does not necessarily imply that there is a race for the
bottom in that period.
A second approach is to assume that a bank would
have kept its pre-switch risk–return profile had it not
changed regulators. By taking this approach, I can
then examine whether a switching bank has a higher29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
failure rate after its change than its steadfast counter-
parts with similar pre-switching profiles. To do this,
I compare the predicted failure probability of the bank
in the year it switches with the actual failure rate. To
get the predicted failure probability, I use the five-year
failure rate model estimated over banks that never
switch regulators (that is, the model with coefficients
reported in column 3 of Table 6). Table 7 gives the
predicted and actual failure rates for all switches,
broken down by the time of the switch and the type
of switch (both merger-related and otherwise). There
is no statistically or economically significant difference
between the predicted and actual failure rates. Specifi-
cally, the failure rate is not higher for banks that switch
regulators in the late period, even if the switches do
not occur after a merger. This is consistent with the
positive coefficient on SWITCH LATE in table 6 arising
because banks that switch in the late period have
lower failure rates than if they had not switched, but
not as low as do banks with their new level of return.
Switches do not appear to increase failure risk.
Using a simple failure prediction model, I have shown
that for most switching banks, their post-switch fail-
ure rate is the same as that of otherwise similar banks.
The one exception is found among banks that switch
regulators after 1991. These banks fail at a higher rate
than otherwise similar banks. However, the failure
prediction model does not compare switchers to banks
that are otherwise similar to the switchers prior to their
changing regulators. In particular, in the late period,
return increases for banks after a switch. Thus, the
“higher failure rate” may be above that for banks with
the new, high ROA, but it is lower than for banks with
the pre-switch ROA. To test this, I have compared
TABLE 6
Predicted failure probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)







LOG ASSETS –0.422 –0.429 –0.456 –0.464 –0.464
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
ROA –0.095 –0.091 –0.092 –0.087 –0.087
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
SHARPE RATIO –0.817 –0.823 –0.676 –0.681 –0.681
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
EQUITY/ASSET –0.318 –0.319 –0.227 –0.230 –0.230
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
LOAN/ASSET 0.059 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.064
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
CHRG/LOAN –0.011 –0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.266) (0.278) (0.263) (0.265) (0.267)
DEP/LIAB 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.332) (0.297) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154)
Observations 225,066 228,980 225,066 228,980 228,980
Pseudo-R2 0.365 0.364 0.297 0.296 0.296
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: The regression is estimated for 1977 to 2001, with year dummies not shown. The logistic regressions in columns 1 and 3 include
all banks that never switch primary federal regulators. The logistic regressions in the other columns include banks that never switch plus
banks that have switched regulators in the previous six years (excluding the year of the switch). Variable definitions are given in the text.
Robust p values adjusted for cluster effects are given in parentheses.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.30 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
the actual failure rate to the level predicted in the
year of a switch. I have found that the actual failure
rate is no higher than the predicted rate, even for
switches after 1991. This implies that switches in
regulators do not increase the level of bank failures.
Robustness
The focus of this article is on changes of primary
federal regulators. There are two potential alternative
approaches to analyzing changes among banks that
I address here. The first one involves an approach in
which the choice of a national versus state charter is
emphasized, without regard to the further choice of
taking membership in the Federal Reserve System
(for banks that elect state charters).15 Using a switch
of charters rather than a switch of primary federal reg-
ulators in the analysis does not change the qualitative
results. When I replicate the performance regressions
in table 4 or the failure prediction model in table 6 for
changes of charters rather than changes of primary
federal regulators, the same coefficients are significant
at the 5 percent confidence level.
A second approach takes into account that for
state-chartered banks, regulation is shared between
federal regulators and state regulators. To control for
the effect of state regulators, I add state dummies for
banks with a state charter. The qualitative results are
unchanged. Examining results on a state-by-state basis,
there are not enough switches to obtain meaningful
results, even for the largest states.
The choice of periods is motivated by changes in
regulation and the pattern of banks that switch. To test
the impact of the division, I run the regression (equa-
tion 1) with a separate set of switching trends and
dummies for each year in which a bank might switch.
I focus on the change in return between the year prior
to a switch and five years after a switch. This analysis
shows a distinct break between 1991 and 1992, with
the change in performance mixed for changes prior
to 1992, but consistently positive thereafter. This
suggests that the break between the early and late
periods is set correctly and is important.
In the main analysis, I exclude switches that might
be related to a merger. As discussed earlier, roughly
one-third of all switches are in the year of a merger
or the following year. Because the threshold for switch-
ing following a merger is different than for switching
at other times (and due to accounting issues), I dropped
merger-related switches from the main sample. When
I examine merger-related switches, the post-switch
changes are qualitatively similar to those for switches
at banks that did not merge in the period before and
after the switch. There is an increase in return, but only
in the late period, 1992–2003, and there is no unam-
biguous indication of an increase in either accounting
or failure risk. Prior to the switch, however, there are
differences in performance for merger-related and
other switches. Heading into a merger-related switch,
return is decreasing. This may be related to reasons
behind the merger (including accounting issues)—
and not to reasons behind the switch. Still, for the pur-
poses of this article, the key is that the post-switch
performance is similar for the two types of switchers.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to shed some light on
the effects of having multiple regulatory agencies in
commercial banking. I have studied the performance
TABLE 7
Predicted and actual failure rates for banks that switch regulators
p value for test of
Predicted failure rate difference between
over the next five Actual failures over predicted and actual
years using equation 3 the next five years failure rate
Both periods (1977–2001) 1.82% 1.46% 0.242
(4.81) (12.01)
Early period (1977–91) 2.99 2.46 0.311
(6.04) (15.50)
Late period (1992–2001) 0.30 0.17 0.459
(1.38) (4.10)
Notes: Failure rates over the next five years for banks that switch regulators as of the end of the year of the switch. The predicted failure
rate is based on the coefficient for regression reported in column 3 of table 6. The standard deviations of the predicted and actual failure
rates are in parentheses.
Source: Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977–2003, Reports of Income and Condition, Washington, DC.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of banks that switch their primary federal regulators
as an indication of whether there is beneficial compe-
tition or a race for the bottom among agencies. Whether
banks are able to increase return without increasing
risk following a switch constitutes my test for benefi-
cial competition. A race for the bottom would be evi-
denced by an increase in the failure rate of banks that
switch, especially if there is no compensatory increase
in return. Overall, I find evidence of beneficial com-
petition instead of a race for the bottom, since return
rises and failure rates remain effectively unchanged.
However, this masks important differences over time.
The reasons for switching regulators may have
changed over time. My sample includes banks that
switched between 1977 and 2003, a period of massive
changes in banking and bank regulation. I divide the
sample into two smaller periods. The early period,
1977–1991, combines two time spans—one marked
by the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) in 1980,
the other notable for the initial lessening of prohibi-
tions on interstate banking in the 1980s. Switches in
the late 1970s and early 1980s may be a response to
DIDMCA or to pre-DIDMCA differences among regu-
lators. Switches in the 1980s through 1991 may reflect
banks adjusting to their new competitive environment,
although the rate of switching during this period was
the lowest in my sample. Finally, in the late period,
1992–2003, prohibitions on interstate banking and on
mergers between banks and other financial firms were
essentially eliminated. Perhaps because of these chang-
es, there was again a major merger wave in banking.
I find that switches in the early part of my sam-
ple—those prior to 1992—had little impact on bank
performance. Return did not change significantly fol-
lowing a switch, and there was no unambiguous ef-
fect on accounting risk. Moreover, the evidence suggests
that bank failure rates did not increase as the result of
switches.
My results imply that banks switching regulators
in the late part of my sample, 1992–2003, increased
return without a rise in bank failures. This is evidence
of beneficial competition among regulators, and sup-
ports the hypothesis that there is specialization among
them. Interestingly, starting in 1992, there was an in-
crease in the rate of regulatory switching that lasted
through at least 2003. It is possible that the increase
in switches was associated with the onset of this type
of beneficial competition.
Finally, note that this analysis is intrinsically limit-
ed to looking at one aspect of regulatory competition.
While I find evidence of beneficial competition only
in the post-1991 period, that should not be taken to
imply that other types of beneficial competition did
not exist throughout my sample period.32 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Regulatory authority for state-chartered banks is shared with the
appropriate state chartering agencies. Unless otherwise stated, when
I refer to a bank’s “regulator” (or “primary regulator”), I mean its
primary federal regulator.
2Butler and Macey (1988) point out that differences among regu-
lators are not very large due in part to the use of federal supremacy
laws. In essence, federal regulators impose their rules on state-char-
tered banks through direct regulation or by making federal deposit
insurance conditional on accepting certain rules.
3Elliehausen (1998) gives estimates of the cost of regulation that
range between 5 percent and 15 percent of non-interest expense,
or between 2 percentage points and 6 percentage points of return
on equity.
4It typically takes between 15 days and 30 days to change primary
regulators. This time is necessary to get approval from the new
regulator. The approval process can be longer if the new regulator
chooses to do an exam prior to approving a new applicant; how-
ever, this is not generally done for banks that are financially strong
and well managed.
5Another potential drawback of having multiple regulatory agen-
cies is that the agencies may respond to their constituencies but
ignore externalities. When externalities are important, control by
local agencies may lead to too little regulation (Baumol and Oates,
1988; Stewart, 1992). As an example, for many years Britain did
not control sulfur emissions from its power plants because pre-
vailing winds blew them offshore, with most of the damage being
felt in continental Europe (Lomas, 1988). I do not examine this
here, since this sort of externality is not a big problem in banking.
6Greenspan spoke in October 1991. Later that year, Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady made similar remarks. The OCC is
part of the Treasury Department.
7In other industries, interpretation of regulations most frequently
occurs at the agency level. There is literature that studies whether
regulatory agencies act as Congress wants them to (see, for example,
Libecap, 1996).
8Berger and Hannan (1998) talk about the desire of bankers for a
quiet life.
9It is also possible to test the source of beneficial competition, but
this is beyond the scope of this article. See Rosen (2003).
10Results using the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans are
more likely to indicate a reduction of risk after a switch than those
using the charge-off-to-loan ratio are. Nonetheless, I use charge-
offs rather than nonperforming loans since data on nonperforming
loans are not available for the entire sample period.
11Whalen (2002) finds lower return and higher risk at banks that
change charters.
12The early period actually comprises two different subperiods,
one marked by the passage of the DIDMCA, the other notable for
the1980s merger wave. Switching activity in the DIDMCA subperiod
was higher than during the bulk of the 1980s. However, there was
no economically important difference in the relative performance
of banks that switched in either subperiod. Thus, to simplify the
exposition, I combined my findings from the two subperiods.
13Recall that these are calculated by considering changes to the
pre- and post-switch trend and dummy variables only.
14I use the three years following a switch as the base years (and
thus, look at failures for either the first six or eight years after a
switch). The reason to restrict how long after a switch I examine
is that, eventually, one cannot attribute a failure to be the direct
result of a switch. However, looking out further after a switch
does not change the qualitative results.
15Whalen (2002) also examines banks that change their charters; how-
ever, that paper does not examine post-change performance indicators.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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